April 2025 Docket Review

This month, the Court issued 6 precedential opinions and 7 allocatur grants. On the opinion side, I’m most interested in Sitler, which holds that the longstanding irrebuttable presumption paternity is now, well, rebuttable, provided that a putative biological father demonstrates a reasonable chance that he is the biological father of a child, and that, considering everyone involved, a determination of paternity by DNA testing would be in the best interests of the child. Particularly given its decision earlier this year to recognize intent-based parentage, the Court’s modernization of the presumption likewise serves the goal of aligning family law principles with modern realities (or, really, honesty about the realities that have been there all along). As Justice Wecht wrote for the Court, the presumption was rooted in part on the difficulty of ascertaining paternity in a pre-DNA era, in part on the fear associated with subjecting children to the legal status of (English law term incoming) bastardy, which the General Assembly long ago abolished, and in part on the goal of preserving existing marriages and family units (although given the circumstances of a third-party potential biological father, one wonders whether the presumption ever really served that goal, and whether it was worth it). Given the change in social structures, the Court landed comfortably in familiar space: that increasingly complex families confound per se rules, and require fact-specific analysis.

And at the risk of again being called a Justice Wecht fanblogger, I’m also interested in Pignetti, which involves the proper valuation of jointly used parcels of land for condemnation purposes. And while the substance of the decision is itself notable in that it abrogated a lower court decision seemingly adopting additional elements beyond joint use, I’m most interested in the Court’s plain meaning analysis, which is certain to feature in future statutory interpretation cases. Apart from admonishing the lower court for not conducting a plain meaning analysis before moving to statutory construction (which unfortunately occurs frequently), Justice Wecht for the Court reiterated that plain meaning is ultimately a judgment call, and while it may be informed by dictionary definitions, it is not controlled by them:

“In search of statutory terms’ common and approved usages, this Court sometimes—but not always—consults dictionaries. We must not substitute dictionary definitions of highly general, familiar terms for statutory text where, as here, the question arises as to which definition’s text to insert. And we should be wary of relying upon dictionary definitions to find ambiguity where the reasonable reader would perceive none.”

The Court’s point is a great one. Common usage is common usage, and judges are more than capable of making judgments about it based on their own common sense and understanding in most cases. To that end, advocates would be wise to consider using more pedestrian methods of demonstrating common usage, and perhaps less inclined to search through varietals of dictionaries for a definition that best fits their preferred reading of a statute.

On the allocatur side, I’m most interested in Clearfield Cnty., albeit in no small part for the Latin. The case involves the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (poorly translated, time does not run against the king), or, as it as sometimes called in the United States, nullum tempus occurrit republicae (we don’t have a king, at least at the moment). In earlier eras, the Court has been willing to reexamine and overrule common-law principles rooted in the notion that the government cannot be held responsible for its actions or inactions, but the General Assembly has not been so eager. It will be interesting to see whether and to what degree the Court is eager to make nullum tempus a dead letter.

I’m also interested in Wilson and Cassell, both of which relate to drug deaths. In Wilson, the Court will consider whether the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act, which is designed to protect reporters of drug overdoses from prosecution, applies to subsequently discovered offenses, an exception that lends itself to fairly fact-specific notions of what is “subsequent” and potentially undermines the purpose of the Act. And in Cassell, the Court will consider whether the Drug Delivery Resulting In Death Statute, which prohibits, well, drug delivery to another person resulting in the other person’s death, applies to individuals who purchase and share drugs. It is interesting that the cases will be heard roughly contemporaneously in that they involve two responses to the epidemic of drug overdoses — one public-health focused response and one punishment-based response — and the lower courts appear to be narrowing the former and expanding the latter. It remains to be seen how the Court will harmonize the approaches.

Precedential Opinions

In the Interest of S.W., 14 WAP 2024 (Opinion by McCaffery, J.) (holding that a statute abrogated an earlier decision giving prospective adoptive parents standing to challenge a child’s removal of a foster child from their care )

See also Concurring Opinion by Brobson, J.

See also Dissenting Opinion by Mundy, J.

Sitler v. Jones, 37 MAP 2024 (Opinion by Wecht, J.) (reconsidering and limiting the presumption that a mother’s spouse is her child’s father and allowing for paternity testing under certain circumstances)

See also Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Donohue, J.

Mezzacappa v. Northampton Cnty., 40 MAP 2024 (Opinion by Todd, C.J.) (holding that a mugshot is an “identifiable description” for purposes of the Criminal History Record Information Act and therefore that only police agencies can disseminate them to individuals)

Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 93 MAP 2023 (Opinion by Todd, C.J.) (holding that an oral request for admission to a mental health facility is sufficient to trigger Mental Health Procedures Act liability)

See also Dissenting Opinion by Wecht, J.

Pignetti v. PennDOT, 26 EAP 2023 (Opinion by Wecht, J.) (holding the Commonwealth Court erred in adding additional requirements for plottage-based property valuation)

See also Dissenting Opinion by Brobson, J.

In re : Nominating Petition of Huff, 11 EAP 2025 (Opinion by Brobson, J.) (clarifying the application of the residency requirement for candidates to a Philadelphia candidate for two judicial offices)

Allocatur Grants

Clearfield Cnty. v. Transystems Corp., 319 WAL 2024 (granting review to consider a county’s invocation of the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi in the context of a statute of repose)

Baclit v. Sloan, 316 WAL 2024 (granting review to consider the scope of limitations of underinsured motorist coverage in an auto insurance policy)

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 343 WAL 2024 (granting review to consider the application of drug-overdose-response immunity to subsequently discovered separate criminal offenses)

Cleveland Bros. Equipment Co., Inc. v. Arcadia North Land, LLC, 625 MAL 2025 (granting review to consider the Mechanics’ Lien Law allows for mechanics’ lien claims for the use of construction equipment used for the improvement of the subject real property)

Aita v. NCB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 531 MAL 2024 (granting review to consider whether the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law limits relief to employees owed wages when they file suit)

Commonwealth v. Cassell, 535 MAL 2024 et al. (granting review to consider whether one co-purchaser and user of drugs “delivers” it to another for purposes of several criminal statutes)

Commonwealth v. Carney, 457 MAL 2024 (granting review to consider whether a defendant prosecuted for allegedly nonconsensual sexual activity who may have believed it was consensual is entitled to a mistake of fact jury instruction)